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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
NO. 06-3087
________________
DAVID O. CARROWAY,
               Appellant
      v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
MORRIS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT;
UNION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT;
J.S.C. JOSEPH A. FALCONE;
VICTOR R. JUSINO, ESQ., ASST. PROSECUTOR;
MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE;
UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE;
HONORABLE J.S.C. JOHN S. TRIARSI;
DAVID HAMMEL, ESQ., ASST. PROSECUTOR
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-CV-00614)
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
September 28, 2006
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, McKEE and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: October 18, 2006)
2_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
David O. Carroway appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, dismissing his complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.  We will similarly dismiss the appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Carroway filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil
rights in connection with the open-court publicizing of his status as an informant on two
separate occasions in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  At the time of the incidents,
Carroway was appearing before the court in criminal proceedings pending against him.
During the first instance, Carroway’s attorney met in chambers with the Judge and
the Assistant Prosecutor.  Carroway’s attorney informed the other two that Carroway was
cooperating with law enforcement in another jurisdiction in a murder case.  Carroway
states that the defendants then stated that he was an informant in a murder case in open
court, before other prisoners and spectators.  He argued that this disclosure violated his
Sixth Amendment rights to attorney client privilege, violated his rights to equal protection
and due process, and led him to being harassed, threatened, assaulted, and living in fear
for his life.
3On the second incident, Carroway appeared in another court on a burglary charge. 
Carroway alleges that the Judge disclosed that he was an informant in open court in front
of corrections officers.  Carroway states that word of the disclosure got back to other
prison staff and inmates, leading to his harassment, assault, and to his suffering extreme
mental anguish and living in fear for his life.  Carroway argues that the disclosure of the
information, received from his attorney, violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel, equal protection of the law, due process, and subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment.  Carroway also alleges that canons of judicial ethics were breached on both
occasions.
Carroway sued the State of New Jersey, the Honorable Joseph A. Falcone, two
Assistant Prosecutors, the Honorable John S. Triarsi, the Superior Court of the State of
New Jersey, Morris County Superior Court, Union County Superior Court, the Morris
County Prosecutor’s Office, and the Union County Prosecutor’s Office.  His complaint
was dismissed for failure to state a claim by the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.  The District Court found that all named defendants were immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment or judicial or prosecutorial immunity.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Carroway’s claims against the
State of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Morris and Union County
Courts on the ground that those defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.  As the District Court correctly stated, the Eleventh Amendment applies to
§ 1983 claims.  Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).  The
Carroway’s motion for appointment of counsel; and his motion for bail, construed1
as a motion for bail pending appeal, are denied as moot.  To the extent he seeks to have
this Court set bail for his state court criminal proceedings, we decline to intercede in the
state court proceedings.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  We similarly deny
Carroway’s motion for an injunction by applying the Younger abstention doctrine.  “For
the Younger doctrine to apply, state court proceedings must be pending or ongoing, the
state proceedings must implicate an important state interest, and the state proceedings
must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional issues.”  Taliaferro v. Darby
Tp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).  We find all three requirements to be
satisfied here.
4
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states.  See Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 813
(3d Cir. 1991).  We further agree that the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Morris
and Union County courts are part of the judicial branch of New Jersey and are thus
immune pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.  Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 869 F.
Supp. 289, 296-98 (D. N.J. 1994).  In any event, none of these courts is a “person” subject
to liability under § 1983.  See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
We agree that because the two state court judges named in the complaint were
acting in a judicial capacity at Carroway’s hearings, they enjoy absolute judicial immunity
for their acts.  Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).  Furthermore, the claims against
the two Assistant Prosecutors were subject to dismissal under the doctrine of absolute
immunity, because there is no indication that they were acting outside their prosecutorial
roles.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
For the above reasons and those stated by the District Court, we will dismiss the
appeal for failure to state a claim upon which may be granted.1
